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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the 
Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated 
January 21, 1999, appeals from a series of orders entered by the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, as follows: 
a. The trial court's order of November 1, 2000 (R. 0289, attachment 1 hereto); 
b. The trial court's judgment of February 16, 2001 (R. 0237, attachment 2 
hereto); 
c. The trial court's order clarifying judgment dated July 2, 2001 (R. 0377, 
attachment 3 hereto); and 
d. The trial court's order of dismissal of the Third Claim for Relief entered 
March 21, 2005 (R. 0740, attachment 4 hereto). 
Through the above-referenced rulings, the trial court held - as a matter of law, and 
without even giving Appellant an opportunity for oral argument, much less trial on the 
merits - that Plaintiffs Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West were entitled to an order, 
judgment and decree quieting title in and to a parcel of real property located in Utah 
County, State of Utah, in themselves, free and clear of any claim of right, title or interest 
therein by Appellant or the Trusts on whose behalf she acted, notwithstanding Appellees' 
open admission that they had failed to comply in full with the terms and conditions of the 
real estate contract entered into with the original trustor; further, finding Appellant in 
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breach of the real estate contract, ordering specific enforcement of the contract in the 
form of a warranty deed from Appellant to Appellees, and awarding Appellees their costs 
and attorneys' fees. Appellees' supplemental claim for slander of title was reserved for 
trial, but abandoned by Appellees on the eve of trial. 
Ample evidence appears in the trial court record which should have precluded the 
entry of summary judgment herein. By Appellees' own admission, and as the trial court 
expressly found, they failed to perform an express covenant in the 1987 real estate 
contract under which they claimed title to the Subject Property: They did not pay any 
taxes on the property during the contract period. Their explanation for this failure is that 
Georgia Lamar West, the named seller under the contract, had told them that they need 
not pay the taxes. In separate conversations with her daughter (Appellant), however, 
Georgia Lamar West expressed concern that the taxes were not being paid. They likewise 
took the insistent step of conveying her interest in the property to the 1993 Trust. Finally, 
when Appellees came to her for a corrective warranty deed in 1998, claiming to have paid 
off the 1987 contract, Georgia Lamar West refused the conveyance - conduct clearly and 
consistent with having waived Appellees' obligation to pay taxes under the 1987 contract. 
These acts, coupled with expressions of concern to her daughter, all as set out in the 
lower court record, showed a precluded summary judgment. 
Even if the Court were correct in finding breach, the breach should have been 
ascribed to the estate of Georgia Lamar West, and not to Appellant or the Trusts which 
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she represents. Neither Appellant nor the Trusts are property "successors" of the estate 
under governing case law, and should not be found in breach of the contract. 
Finally, Appellant was entitled to oral argument on the various motions 
culminating in the final order of summary judgment herein. 
JURISDICTION AND BASIS FOR APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah 
County, State of Utah, quieting title in and to a parcel of real property located in Utah 
County, State of Utah; finding, as a matter of law, that Defendant was in breach of her 
Uniform Real Estate Contract relating to that property; ordering specific performance of 
the Real Estate Contract, and awarding costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to the terms of 
the contract. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The 
appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs/ 
Appellees were entitled to an order quieting title in and to the Subject Property in them, 
free and clear of any claim of Defendant/Appellant1. 
]This issue was not addressed to the trial court on motion for summary judgment; 
however, to the extent that it challenges the justiciability of the claim, it goes to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and may therefore be raised at any point in the 
proceedings - see State v. Sun Surety Insurance Co., 2004 UT 74, 99 P. 3d 818. 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Defendant/ 
Appellant was in breach of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract through her refusal to 
convey, on behalf of the May 6, 1993 trust for the January 21, 1999 trust any interest in 
and to the Subject Property, notwithstanding Appellees' failure to pay taxes on the 
Subject Property during the contract period as required by the terms of the 1987 Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, thus entitling Plaintiff/Appellees to specific performance of the 
contract and an award of costs and attorneys fees2. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Georgia 
Lamar West had waived Appellees' obligation to taxes on the Subject Property during the 
period of the 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract3. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Defendant/ 
Appellant was the successor-in-interest to the Georgia Lamar West and/or the Estate of 
Georgia Lamar West, and therefore obligated under the 1987 Uniform Real Estate 
Contract4. 
5. Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant oral argument on 
summary judgment5. 
Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336. 
Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336. 
"Preserved at R. 0199, 0300, 0336. 
Preserved at R.0190, 0241, 0299, 0326. 
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The standard of review for all of the foregoing issues is that applicable to orders 
granting summary judgment generally - the decision is reviewed for correctness, 
affording no deference to the trial court's decision. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 Utah 25, 979 P.2d 332. The court reviews the record, and construes all 
facts in the light most favorable to defendant/appellant, and sustains the lower court's 
ruling only if, as a matter of law, no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding 
entry of summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991). 
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Peterson v. Peterson, 190 P.2d 135, 112 Utah 554 (Utah 1948) 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (UT App. 1988) 
Andrus v. Bagley, 115 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989) 
Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940) 
UPC, Inc. v. ROA General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (UT App. 1999) 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975) 
Rule 4-501(3)(C), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.6 
6Since the effective courts' rulings in this regard, Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration has been repealed and replaced by various provisions of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
700216vl 5 14064.0001 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellees Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West ("Appellees") filed this 
action on December 28, 1999, claiming that (1) they were entitled to a finding that 
Defendant and Appellant Claudia N. Case, individually and as Trustee of the Lamar West 
Trust dated May 6, 1993 and the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, was 
in breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1987 between Georgia Lamar 
West and Appellees, under which Georgia Lamar West promised (pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of the 1987 agreement) to convey to Appellees title to a parcel of real 
property located in Utah County, State of Utah; (2) an order quieting title in and to the 
Subject Property in Appellees; and (3) a judgment in favor of Appellees and against 
Appellants for Appellants' slander of Appellees' title to the Subject Property. 
Appellees filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 25, 2000, seeking 
judgment as a matter of law on their breach of contract and quiet title claims, and 
reserving the slander of title claim for trial. The trial court initially denied the motion for 
summary judgment, finding factual disputes as to Appellees' performance of the 1987 
agreement (R. 0237); thereafter, however, the court reversed itself and granted the motion 
(R. 0247, 0389). In entering judgment, the court quieted title to the Subject Property in 
Appellees; found Appellant - not the estate of Georgia Lamar West - in breach of the 
1987 agreement; ordered specific performance of the 1987 agreement by Appellant; and 
awarded Appellees their costs and attorneys' fees. 
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Subsequent motion practice clarified that the award of attorneys' fees was against 
the Trusts represented by Appellant Claudia N. Case, and not against Claudia N. Case 
individually; in other respects, the court did not modify its prior ruling (R. 0377). 
Appellees' remaining claim for slander of title was reserved for trial, which was 
scheduled to commence March 21, 2005. On that date, however, the parties presented the 
court with a stipulation dismissing the slander of title claim, resulting in a final order of 
the court as of that date (R. 0740). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Underlying Facts 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellees Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West are individuals 
who reside at 3660 West 100 North, American Fork, Utah County, State of Utah. 
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, 0024.) 
2. Defendant/Appellant is an individual who, at the times relevant to this 
action, has also been a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. (Complaint, R. 0015; 
Answer, 0024.) 
3. Defendant and Plaintiff Mary Helen West are sisters, and daughters of 
Georgia Lamar West (formerly known as Lamar Nerdin). The children of Georgia Lamar 
West are as follows: 
Lewis L. Dade; 
Georgia LaRay Christensen; 
Marion William Dade; 
Mark Ernest Dade; 
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Mary Helen West; 
Joseph William Nerdin; 
Betty Jo Nerdin West; and 
Defendant Claudia Nerdin Case. 
(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
4. On or about April 8, 1987, Appellees entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with Georgia Lamar West ("1987 Agreemenf), pursuant to the terms of which 
Appellees agreed to purchase, and Georgia Lamar West agreed to sell, a parcel of land 
located in Utah County, State of Utah, at 386 West Pacific Drive, American Fork, Utah, 
more particularly described as follows: 
Parcel 2: Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and 333.45 
feet South from the American Fork City monument at the center line 
intersection of 300 West Street and 300 North Street; thence North 84°30' 
West 30.00 feet; thence South 16059,15,/ West 176.14 feet to the North 
Right-of-Way line of Union Pacific Railroad Company; thence South 
63°23' East 89.29 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25' 
East 205.68 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 0.25 acres. 
Parcel 3: Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and South 333.45 
feet from the American Fork City monument at the center line intersection of 300 
West Street and 300 North Street; thence South 0°25'00" West 205.58 feet to the 
North Right-of-Way line of the Union Pacific Railroad Company; thence South 
63°23'00" East 55.40 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25'00" 
East 225.61 feet along the fence line; thence North 84°30'00" West 49.91 feet to 
the point of beginning. Containing 0.246 acres. 
("Subject Property"). (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, 0024; 1987 Agreement, R. 0157) 
5. The 1987 Agreement provided in part as follows: 
The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature 
which are or which may be assessed and which may become due on these 
premises during the life of this Agreement. The Seller hereby covenants 
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and agrees that there are no assessments against said premises except the 
following: 
a. Buyer and the Seller mutually agree that the Seller is to retain 
exclusive ownership of the usage of an existing flowing well 
located on Parcel 2 as named above and that the Buyer is not 
purchasing by this Agreement any rights appurtenant to the 
usage of the well or any water flowing from said well. 
(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
6. The Agreement further provided in part as follows: 
In the event of the failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or 
upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment or payments when the same 
shall become due, or within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Seller, at his 
option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
a. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to 
remedy the default within five (5) days after written notice, to 
be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey 
said property, at all payment which have been made 
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to 
the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance of 
the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his 
option re-enter and take possession of said premises without 
legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with 
all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, 
and the said additions and improvements shall remain with the 
land, shall become property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming 
at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
b. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all 
delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's fees. 
(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not 
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of the 
other remedies hereafter in the event of a subsequent default); 
or 
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c. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written 
notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this 
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer 
subject thereto, and to proceed immediately to foreclose the 
same in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and 
have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the 
payment of the balance owing, including costs and attorney's 
fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency 
which may remain. 
(May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
7. The parties to the 1987 Agreement agreed that time was of the essence to 
the performance thereof. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
8. On the same date as the 1987 Agreement, Lamar West executed a Warranty 
Deed, with herself as Grantor and Appellees as Grantees, conveying the subject property 
to Plaintiffs, and placed the same in escrow pending full payment under the contract. 
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024; 1987 Warranty Deed, R. 0154) 
9. Between 1987 and 1998, Appellees made payments under the contract; 
Appellees never, however, paid taxes assessed against the subject property by Utah 
County. (Affidavit of Claudia Case, R.0188, at 1| 8) 
10. Before the trial court, Appellees maintained that, during her lifetime, 
Georgia Lamar West told them that "they did not have to worry about paying the property 
taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for the time period that 
the warranty deed was to be held in escrow" (see Supplemental Affidavit of Mary Helen 
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West, R. 210, at f^ 4); Appellees never maintained, however, that their obligation to pay 
taxes under the 1987 contract was waived in writing. 
11. On or about May 6, 1993, Georgia Lamar West created the Lamar West 
Trust. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
12. The express purpose of the Lamar West Trust was for the primary benefit of 
Lamar West during her lifetime, and her family thereafter. (May 6, 1993 Trust 
Agreement, R. 0152) 
13. The 1993 Trust designated Georgia Lamar West as original Trustee thereof, 
and Appellees as replacement Trustees in the event of (and for the period of) any 
incapacitation of Georgia Lamar West. (May 6, 1993 Trust Agreement, R. 0152) 
14. Also on May 6, 1993, Georgia Lamar West executed a quitclaim deed 
which purported to convey all of her right, title and interest in and to, inter alia, the 
subject property to the 1993 Trust. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0027; R. 0133) 
15. Between the date of the 1987 Agreement and November 20, 1997, 
Appellant performed numerous care services for Georgia Lamar West, including purchase 
of groceries and supplies, transportation, healthcare, and other similar services; however, 
Georgia Lamar West began to express concerns to Appellant, and other family members, 
over the manner in which Appellees took the checkbook away from her and took her mail 
away from her. According to Georgia Lamar West, checks drawn on her account were 
not always signed by her. She expressed concern on several occasions that she was 
7002l6vl 11 14064.0001 
concerned that Appellees were going to place her in a nursing home, and was under great 
fear that she would in fact be placed in a nursing home. (See Defendants' Answers to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Request for 
Production of Documents, R. 0666, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 9, p. 6 thereof.) 
16. During the same conversations, Georgia Lamar West expressed concern to 
Appellant that taxes on the property were not being paid. Id, 
17. On November 20, 1997, Georgia Lamar West executed an amendment to 
the 1993 Trust, which, among other changes, removed Appellees as named successor 
trustees, and appointed Defendant and her sister, Betty Jo Nerdin West, as successor 
co-trustees thereunder. (R. 0123) 
18. On March 30, 1998, Appellees sought and received, from the escrow 
handling the 1987 contract, notification that all payments due under the 1987 contract had 
been paid, and presenting the 1987 Warranty Deed for recording. (Complaint, R. 0015; 
Answer, R. 0024) 
19. Upon recording of the 1987 Warranty Deed, however, Appellees received a 
Notice of Discrepancy from the Office of the Utah County Recorder, noting that, as of 
that date, the Grantor was not vested with title, rather, that title had been conveyed to the 
1993 Trust with Lamar West as Trustee. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024) 
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20. Appellees thereupon prepared a replacement Warranty Deed, and made 
demand upon Georgia Lamar West to execute the same on behalf of the 1993 Trust. 
(Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, R. 0024) 
21. Georgia Lamar West, on behalf of herself and the 1993 Trust, refused to 
execute Appellees' proposed Warranty Deed in 1998. (Complaint, R. 0015; Answer, 
R. 0024) 
22. On January 21, 1999, Georgia Lamar West established the Georgia Lamar 
West Trust of that date ("1999 Trust"). (R. 0126) 
23. By its terms, the 1999 Trust "amends in its entirety any other Trust I may 
have." (R. 0126) 
24. The 1999 Trust had, as its stated and express purpose, the provision for 
Marion William Dade during his lifetime, and after his death, the distribution of trust 
assets among the children of Georgia Lamar West as provided therein. (R. 0126) 
25. Pursuant to the terms of the 1999 Trust, Georgia Lamar West, as Trustor, 
expressed her intent to transfer all property in the 1993 Trust to the 1999 Trust. (R. 0126) 
26. Claudia N. Case was named as Trustee of the 1999 Trust. (R. 0126) 
27. Georgia Lamar West died March 1, 1999. (R. 0015) 
28. Appellant thereafter executed a quit-claim deed dated June 9, 1999. 
(R. 0098) 
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29. By the quit-claim deed, Appellant transferred, from the 1993 Trust to the 
1999 Trust, all of the 1993 Trust rights, title and interest in and to the following described 
parcel of real property: 
Beginning at a fence corner, which point is South 165.14 feet and west 
361.08 feet from the Southwest corner of Block 36, Plat "A", American 
Fork City survey of building lots; Thence North 89°33,33" West along a 
fence line, 217.23 feet to a fence comer; Thence South 0°31 '39" West 
along a fence line, 153.42 feet to a fence corner; thence South 81°51 '18" 
West along a fence, 9.53 feet to a fence line; thence South 5°33'26"West 
along a fence line, 162.79 feet to the North line of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Right-of-Way; Thence South 63°33'33" East along said Right-of-
Way, 270.54 feet to a fence line: Thence North 0°12'36" East along said 
fence line, 435.59 feet to the point of beginning area-1.979 acres. 
("Quit-Claim Deed Property"). (R. 0098) 
30. Appellant was given to understand that there were two purposes for the 
1999 Quit-Claim Deed: 
a. Utah County had advised that there were discrepancies in the legal 
descriptions, and the deed was intended to correct such 
discrepancies; and 
b. The Deed was part of a general transfer of assets (including money 
and CDs) from one Trust to the other. 
(Affidavit of Claudia Case, R. 0364 at If 3.) 
B. Course of Proceedings Before the Trial Court 
31. Plaintiffs/Appellees filed a Complaint herein on December 28, 1999. 
(R.0015) 
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32. In the Complaint, Appellees sought an order quieting title in and to the 
Subject Property in themselves, free and clear of any claim by Appellant or the Trusts 
which she represents; further, a judgment for breach of contract by Appellant; finally, for 
damages due to an alleged slander of the title to the property. (R. 0015) 
33. Appellees moved the court for partial summary judgment on July 25, 2000, 
and requested oral argument as of that same date. (R. 0065) 
34. Appellees' reply memorandum in support of their motion for partial 
summary judgment filed September 5, 2000, attached additional and supplemental 
affidavits, raising new allegations of fact which Appellees did not have the opportunity to 
address. (R. 0234) 
35. The trial court's initial memorandum decision, entered September 6, 2000 
(R.0237), denied Appellees' motion for summary judgment; thereafter, by memorandum 
decision dated October 2, 2000 (R. 0247), the court reversed itself and granted summary 
judgment quieting title in and to the Subject Property in Appellees, finding Appellant to 
be successor-in-interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and liable to Appellees 
for breach of that agreement; and ordering specific performance of the agreement in the 
form of a warranty deed from Appellant to Appellees. No hearing was afforded in this 
regard. The court's October 2, 2000 memorandum decision was reflected in an order 
dated November 1, 2000. (R. 0389) 
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36. On November 13, 2000, Appellant moved for an amendment of the Court's 
order and for reconsideration, requesting oral argument thereon. (R. 0302) 
37. By memorandum decision dated January 18, 2001, the trial court denied 
Appellant's motion, and again refused to grant oral argument. (R. 0340) 
38. The court's memorandum decision was reflected in an order dated 
February 15, 2001. (R. 0345) 
39. The trial court entered judgment on February 16, 2001 in favor of Appellees 
and against Appellant in the amount of $1,537.50 for attorneys' fees. (R. 0347) 
40. By order dated July 2, 2001, the trial court clarified its prior rulings in the 
case, holding that all judgments entered therein were against the Defendant trust and not 
against Claudia N. Case individually. (R. 0377) 
41. Pursuant to Stipulation dated March 21, 2005, Appellees' remaining cause 
of action (slander of title) was dismissed by court order of that same date. The court's 
order was entered as a final adjudication of all issues in the case on the merits effective as 
of that date. (R. 0740) 
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS 
There are no related or prior appeals relative to this action.7 
7
 In a separate and unrelated proceeding, styled Gordon Case & Company, a Utah 
business entity, Plaintiff, v. Arnold West, an individual, and Mary Helen West, an 
individual, Defendants (Case No. 030200433), Gordon Case, husband to Appellant, 
sought eviction of Appellees from the Subject Property following a non-judicial 
foreclosure of a deed of trust on the Subject Property. The trial court dismissed the 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees' Complaint did not make out a cause of action under the Utah Quiet 
Title Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, et seq. Appellees did not allege, and have not 
shown facts to establish, that they were defending their title in and to the Subject Property 
against an adverse claim; rather, they were claiming a contract right to receive a 
conveyance of title under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Under governing law, the 
order quieting title was therefore inappropriate. 
In compelling specific performance of the 1987 agreement, the trial court 
overlooked evidence of record establishing the existence of genuine issues of material 
fact. Specifically, the trial court disregarded the fact that, in petitioning for specific 
performance of the 1987 agreement, Appellees had failed to perform a material covenant 
under that agreement - they failed to pay the taxes on the property during the contract 
period, a payment expressly incumbent upon them under the terms of the agreement. The 
trial court's observation that Georgia Lamar West, the trustor of both Appellant Trusts, 
had "waived" the tax payment requirement was clearly not sustainable as a matter of 
law - both by words to Appellant Claudia N. Case and by her conduct in transferring title 
to the 1993 Trust, and in refusing to convey title to Appellees when they claimed to have 
action, from which Plaintiff Gordon Case appealed to this Court (Appeal No. 20040135-
CA). 
700216vl 17 14064.0001 
performed the 1987 agreement in full, Georgia Lamar West evidenced an intent not to 
waive the requirements of the agreement. 
Even if the Court were to find that Georgia Lamar West was in breach of the 1987 
agreement (when, in 1998, she refused to convey title to the property), that breach should 
not be ascribable to the Appellant or the Trusts she represents. Neither Appellant nor the 
Trusts are "successors-in-interest" within the meaning of governing case law. The party 
in breach (if any) should be the estate of Georgia Lamar West. 
Appellees' proffered evidence concerning "waiver," in fact, consisted of their 
testimonies that, prior to her death, Georgia Lamar West actually volunteered to make tax 
payments herself, rather than asking Appellees to honor their contractual commitment to 
do so. As such, the suggested "waiver" is actually a modification of the terms of the 1987 
agreement; since the agreement itself is required to be in writing under Utah's Statute of 
Frauds, any claimed verbal modification thereof is invalid, and should not have formed 
the basis of summary judgment. 
Finally, Appellant was entitled (pursuant to both procedural rules in effect at the 
time, and those which have replaced them) to oral argument on Appellees' motion for 
partial summary judgment, and on motions brought subsequent to the court's ruling 
thereon. Yet the court ruled in each instance without affording the parties a chance to 
present argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I APPELLEES' CLAIMS WERE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT IN AN ACTION FOR QUIET 
TITLE, AND DEFICIENT UNDER RULE 12(b)(6), 
Utah R. CIV. P. 
Appellees' Second Claim for Relief was pled, and urged on motion for partial 
summary judgment, as one to quiet title in and to the Subject Property and Appellees, free 
and clear of Appellant's claim. Appellees' supporting allegations, however, did not make 
out a quiet title claim; rather, they sought specific enforcement of a contract to acquire 
title to the Subject Property. As such, Appellees' Complaint did not state a quiet title 
claim, and was deficient under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.; for the same reason, the 
trial court erred in granting the requested relief. 
An action to quiet title is a statutory proceeding - its bases are established, and its 
remedies limited, by legislation. JackB. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131 
(Utah 1988). Utah's quiet title statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, et seq.9 establishes the 
bases and parameters of a quiet title action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 defines a quiet 
title action: 
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an 
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property 
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
In the case of State, et al v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 1979), the court held that the 
quiet title statute could not be relied upon by a holder of a lien on real property: 
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[A] quiet title action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet an existing title 
against an adverse or hostile claim of another and not one brought to 
establish title. One seeking such equitable relief must establish title, 
entitlement to possession, and that the estate or interest claimed by others is 
adverse or hostile to the alleged claims of title or interest. Hence it is to be 
seen that the effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather is 
to perfect an existing title as against other claimants. 
590 P.2d at 337 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 
cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that an action in quiet title could not sustain 
claim by a vendor under a Uniform Real Estate Contract against the assignee of the 
vendee's interest thereunder, for damages due to refusal to release title to property. 
Appellees' Complaint in this matter (R. 0015) nowhere asserts that they hold title 
to the Subject Property. Rather, they assert contract rights to receive title to the property, 
having claimed total performance under the contract; they then claimed that Appellant's 
failure to transfer title is wrongful. In short, Appellees' claims in this action do not make 
out a cause of action under the quiet title statute. The relief afforded by the trial court 
thereunder was therefore improvident, and should be reversed. 
POINT II GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE 1987 REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
There is no more fundamental rule of law than the proposition that summary 
judgment should never be entered in the presence of genuine issues of triable fact. 
Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 Utah 130, 63 P.3d 705; Jackson v. Mateus, 
2003 Utah 18, 70 P.3d 78; Couris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 Utah 19, 70 P.3d 72. A 
700216vl 20 14064.0001 
motion for summary judgment must assume facts as asserted by the opposing party, and 
granted only where, given that assumption, there is still no way that the opposing party 
could prevail. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). Even a single sworn 
statement is sufficient to preclude summary judgment- Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 
(Utah 1983). 
The record before the trial court clearly establishes the presence of a pivotal issue 
of fact, which should have precluded the entry of summary judgment on Appellees' quiet 
title/specific performance claim. As such, the ruling of the lower court should be 
reversed. 
A. Appellees Failed to Perform in Full the Requirements of the 1987 Real 
Estate Contract, and Were Thus Precluded From Seeking Specific 
Enforcement Thereof. 
The first claim for relief in Appellees' complaint sought an order of this court 
declaring that Appellant, although not a party to the 1987 real estate contract (see below) 
was in breach thereof, and entering "an order of specific performance requiring 
Defendant to properly execute a warranty deed to Plaintiffs giving them an unencumbered 
title to the property in question" (Complaint, R.0015, <| 28). In response to Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment, the lower court initially recognized the impropriety of 
finding in their favor as a matter of law: 
The court believes there are genuine issues of material fact in this 
case, such as whether Plaintiffs successfully completed the escrow 
conditions. 
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(Court's ruling of September 6, 2000, R.0237, p. 1). On motion for reconsideration, 
however, the trial court entered its October 2, 2000 Memorandum Decision (R.0247), 
reversing its prior holding and finding that, as a matter of law, Appellees were not in 
breach of the 1987 agreement (or that any such breach had been waived by Georgia 
Lamar West prior to her death-see (B), below), and entered an order of specific 
performance of the contract. 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy (Romrell v. Zions First National 
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980)). As such, a party seeking specific performance is 
seeking equity, and must "do equity" by performing his/her obligation under the 
agreement, in order to merit the requested relief. LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorian, 753 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1988). 
Appellees' 1987 bargain with Georgia Lamar West was clear and specific in its 
terms: upon full payment of the entire purchase price-including all assessed 
taxes-Appellees were entitled to conveyance of Georgia Lamar West's right, title and 
interest in and to the subject property: 
The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and 
nature which are or which may be assessed and which may become due on 
these premises during the life of this Agreement. 
By Appellees' own admission, they paid no taxes whatever on the subject property 
at any time during the contract period, their own express covenant to do so 
notwithstanding. Their own sworn testimony establishes this fact-supplemental affidavit 
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of Mary Helen West (R.0210) at ^ 4 and 5; supplemental affidavit of Arnold Kay West 
(R.0213) at Tj 4 and 5; the Court's ruling granting summary judgment (R. 0247) 
acknowledged as much. 
Having failed to perform according to the contract (unless such performance is 
excused-see below), Appellees came before the trial court with unclean hands, and were 
not entitled to the remedy of specific performance. 
B. Reallocation of Appellees' Tax Payment Obligation to Lamar West 
Would Constitute a Material Modification of the 1987 Agreement, and 
Is Therefore Barred by Operation of the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court's dismissal of Appellees' admitted failure to pay property taxes on 
the Subject Property during the contract period was based on the doctrine of "waiver." 
Setting aside, for the moment, that a significant fact question existed concerning the 
applicability of the waiver doctrine in this case (see Subpoint C, below), it is submitted 
that the trial court disregarded the express terms of the contract, and Appellees' aversion 
of the facts concerning the "waiver" claim. 
In their supplemental affidavits before the court (R. 0210 and 0213), Appellees' 
both testify as follows: 
On several occasions over the course of several years, Lamar West stated to 
me and my husband [/wife] that we did not have to worry about paying the 
property taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for 
the time period that the warranty deed was held in escrow. 
(Supplemental Affidavit of Mary Helen West, R. 0210 at f^ 4; Supplemental Affidavit of 
Arnold K. West, R. 0213 at ^ 4; emphasis added.) In other words, even accepting 
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Appellees' controverted testimony, Lamar West not only waived Appellees' performance 
under the 1987 agreement concerning tax payment, but affirmatively offered to assume 
their obligation in this regard. 
The urged testimony, in short, constitutes a material modification of the terms of 
the contract, transferring a significant obligation away from the purchasers and onto the 
vendor. It is well established that, where a contract falls within the operation of Utah's 
Statute of Frauds, any material modification of its terms, like the contract itself, must be 
in writing. This was established in the case of Zion 's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319 (Utah 1975), in which the Supreme Court stated the following: 
It is elementary that when a contract is required to be in writing, the same 
requirement applies with equal force to any alteration or modification 
thereof [citing Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1]. 
538P.2datl322. 
It is beyond dispute that the 1987 agreement was a contract for conveyance of an 
interest in land, and fell squarely within Utah's Statute of Frauds. Appellees' reliance 
upon a verbal modification of the terms of that agreement, and a transfer of responsibility 
thereunder from purchaser to vendor, or, in this case, to Appellant (see below) clearly 
falls afoul of the Statute of Frauds. For this reason, it should have been disregarded by 
the lower court, and summary judgment denied. 
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C. Appellees' Performance Under the Real Estate Contract Was Not 
Excused as a Matter of Law Under the Doctrine of Waiver. 
In reversing its own prior order recognizing the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment herein, the lower court determined that, as a 
matter of law, Appellees' contractual obligation to pay taxes on the property during the 
contract period had been waived. Observing that "Plaintiffs concede that they did not 
pay taxes on the property while the warranty deed was in escrow" (court's memorandum 
decision of October 2, 2000, R.0247, at p. 2), the court concluded that, by her conduct, 
Georgia Lamar West had waived the tax obligation under the contract; the court further 
concluded that such waiver had been established as a matter of law, and that no genuine 
issue of material fact existed thereon which would justify trial (or even oral argument -
see Point III, below). R.0245 
The court's ruling, however, flatly overlooked the following: 
i. As noted above, while Appellees filed affidavits declaring that 
Georgia Lamar West had stated that they "did not have to worry about paying the 
property taxes on the property and that she would pay the property taxes for the 
time period that the warranty was held in escrow" (R.0210 and 0213), the record is 
devoid of any evidence that the 1987 real estate contract was ever modified in 
writing to reflect such waiver. 
ii. Appellees' suggestion that Georgia Lamar West blithely volunteered 
to pay real estate taxes on their behalf (in the place of having required Appellees to 
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do so by contract) is flatly contradicted by Lamar West's declarations to Appellant, 
the designated trustee of both the 1993 and 1999 trusts, expressing concern that the 
taxes were not being paid - Defendants Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents (R.0666) at p. 6. 
iii. Lamar West's declarations to Appellant, moreover, were consistent 
with her other expressions of concern regarding Appellees' treatment of her, 
including reports that Appellees were forging checks on her account, and were 
threatening to place her in a nursing home - Id. 
iv. Most important, Lamar West's clear lack of intent to waive the 
property tax requirement is most clearly emphasized by the fact that, in 1993, she 
conveyed her right in and to the subject property to the 1993 trust; further, that 
upon Appellees' demand for issuance of a corrective deed, Georgia Lamar West -
by Appellees own admission - flatly refused the requested conveyance (Complaint, 
R.0015, atT[ 13). 
Waiver of a contracted-for right may only be found from words or conduct 
evincing the deliberate relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, one's 
actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an 
intent to waive, and must be inconsistent with any other intent - Hunter v. Hunter, 669 
P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Georgia Lamar West's words are in dispute between the parties; 
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her conduct most definitely is not. Had she intended to waive the tax requirement when 
asked for a corrective deed in 1998, why would she refuse? Why would she thereafter 
direct conveyance of the property from the 1993 trust to the 1999 trust? The trial court's 
finding of waiver, in light of the foregoing uncertainties, was clearly error, and should be 
reversed. 
POINT III APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN 
BREACH OF THE 1987 REAL ESTATE AGREEMENT 
It is undisputed that Appellant, Claudia N. Case, was not a party to the 1987 real 
estate agreement, either individually or in her capacity as trustee of either the 1993 or the 
1999 trust. Nevertheless, the lower court found that, as a matter of law, Appellant was in 
breach of that agreement for failure to disregard her mother's clear intent and convey the 
Subject Property to Appellants without their having fulfilled the terms of the agreement. 
Given the undisputed (much less the Appellant's version of disputed) facts in this matter, 
the finding was clearly in error. 
The October 2, 2000 memorandum decision (R.0247) concluded, without much 
explanation, that the 1987 contract was binding on the "heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors and assigns" of Lamar West - and leapt therefrom with the conclusion that 
Appellant was in breach of the agreement, notwithstanding the fact that her mother, not 
herself, had been responsible for conveyance of the property into the first trust, and from 
the first trust to the second trust, in defiance of any obligation under the 1987 agreement. 
Even assuming that the withholding of title to the Subject Property from Appellants was 
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wrongful, the act is ascribable to Georgia Lamar West (and thereafter to her estate), and 
not to the trusts or to Appellant as trustee thereof. 
At Appellees' urging, the lower court disregarded this distinction, citing the case 
of Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, 888 P.2d 659 (Court of 
Appeals, Utah 1994). The court's reliance in this regard, however, was misplaced. 
It is important to remember that the Lamar West Trust obtained its interest in the 
subject property by quit-claim deed, not by inheritance. In Oquirrh, addressing 
contractual language very similar to that in the instant case, the court held that such a 
conveyance does not impose liability upon the successor under the contract: 
Oquirrh argues that by accepting the quitclaim deed, Forthcoming became a 
direct "successor" of the Loiselles in accordance with the terms of the 
Oquirrh-Loiselle contract and thus, became contractually bound to the terms 
of that agreement. 
However, Oquirrh's claim fails for several reasons. First, the language in 
the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract referring to "heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors and assigns" of the parties can only refer to those who succeed 
to one party's interest in the contract through inheritance, assignment, or 
the like. A quitclaim deed is generally defined as "[a] deed of conveyance 
operating by way of release; that is, intended to pass any title, interest, or 
claim which the grantor may have in the premises" Black's Law Dictionary 
1251 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). Furthermore, such a deed "purports 
to transfer nothing more than [an] interest which [the] grantor may have. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
888 P.2d at 663. Thus, the Oquirrh decision holds that an entity which receives title by 
quit claim deed is not a successor to the contract. 
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Numerous other decisions confirm that the grantee of a buyer's interest under a 
contract does not become bound to perform any of the obligations of the contract. In 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Hansens sold a 
motel to Synvest Corporation. Synvest immediately conveyed its interest to a partnership 
known as Green River Group, which included some of the same principals as Synvest. 
The contract signed by Green River Group included the following clause: "Buyer agrees 
to abide and be bound by the conditions that appear in all underlying contract [sic]." 748 
P.2d at 1104. Hansens attempted to hold Green River Group liable for breaches of 
contract by Synvest. The claim was stronger than that in the instant case because Green 
River Group had arguably agreed to be bound by the terms of the underlying contract. 
The court nonetheless held that Hansens had only privity of estate and not privity of 
contract with Green River Group and could not be held liable for any breach of contract 
to Hansens. 
Similarly, in Andrus v. Bagley, 775 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989), Dolans conveyed 
property to Bagleys, who conveyed it to Hayeses, who conveyed it to Andrus. After 
Andrus paid off the contract, he sought to obtain a warranty deed fro his predecessors in 
title. Dolans were nowhere to be found, so he sought a judgment against Bagleys for 
failing to deliver the deed. Andrus sought, and the trial court awarded, attorney fees 
against Bagleys. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bagley-Hayes 
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contract was not assigned to Andrus and he was not a third-party beneficiary under that 
contract. 
In Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), Latses purchased 
property in which Nick Floor was an existing tenant and attempted to evict Nick Floor. 
The trial court held Nick Floor had a valid long-term lease and denied the eviction, but 
also awarded Nick Floor $500.00 as attorney fees against Latses. The award of attorney 
fees was based on the lease between Nick Floor and Latses' predecessor in title. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the attorney fee award: 
The lower court in deciding in favor of respondent awarded it $500 
as attorney's fees. Appellants take exception to this allowance on the 
ground that there is no privity between them and respondent, and that this 
covenant is not one running with the land. We are of the opinion that 
appellants are correct in their version of this part of the case. This was 
purely a personal covenant as between the parties to the contract. Though 
appellants purchased the property subject to the tenancy, they did not 
expressly agree to abide by the terms of the lease. 
104P.2d619at624. 
Appellant was not joined in this action as Lamar West's heir, or as the personal 
representative of her estate. She was sued as trustee of two trusts, each of which held title 
to the subject property, in turn, by quit claim conveyance, not by inheritance or 
assignment. As such, no remedy should have been afforded against Appellant on the 
trust's behalf. 
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POINT IV APPELLEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT AFFORDING 
APPELLANT A HEARING 
As demonstrated by the attached orders, the trial court entered numerous interim 
decisions before finally deciding this matter (at one point completely contradicting 
itself) - all without granting to Appellant her repeated request for oral argument on the 
issues before the court. In the face of Appellees' motion for summary judgment, 
Appellant requested oral argument (R.0190); when the court subsequently reversed itself 
upon Appellees' request for clarification (again requesting oral argument-R.0241), 
Appellant moved for an amendment to the order and for reconsideration, again asserting 
her right to oral argument (R.0299). Upon submittal of her motion for decision, 
Appellant renewed her request for oral argument (R. 0326). That the trial court entered 
each of the attached orders without affording either party a hearing on their contentions. 
Rule 4-501(3)(C), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, in effect at the time of 
the lower court's rulings, expressly granted to Appellant the opportunity for oral 
argument before entry of an order granting a dispositive motion; 
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the 
time of filing the principle memorandum in support of or in opposition to a 
motion may file a written request for a hearing. . . such request shall be 
granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
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governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided.8 
The trial court made no finding that Appellant was frivolous in her opposition to 
Appellees' motion for summary judgment, or that the issues underlying the motion had 
been "authoritatively decided". Indeed, the trial court itself first found in Appellant's 
favor, and reversed itself only upon subsequent motion. It is submitted that, under these 
circumstances, the affording of an oral argument was incumbent on the lower court, and 
its refusal constituted reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Regrettably, the pivotal fact in this case - the intentions of Georgia Lamar West 
concerning the rights of one daughter over her remaining children - rest with the words 
and intents of a deceased witness. The trier of fact, under such circumstances, must piece 
together the decedents desires and intents from the remaining evidence: her words to 
others, and her conduct. 
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the lower court disregarded completely 
the presence of clear issues of triable fact in concluding that Appellees were entitled, as a 
matter of law, to a conveyance of title in and to the subject property, as well as an award 
of costs and attorney's fees against the Appellant in her representative capacity. 
8In 2003, Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was repealed, 
and its requirements incorporated into a revision of Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; recorded requirements for oral argument on a dispositive motion are now 
contained at Rule 7(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Appellees' failure to live up to the terms of the contract, supported by nothing more than 
their self-serving declarations concerning verbal waiver by a deceased parent, should not 
have been sufficient to withstand a challenge to the motion for summary judgment, as the 
trial court itself initially found. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the entry of summary judgment by 
the trial court should be reversed, and this matter remitted for trial on the merits. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 2005. 
JONES WALDO HOpROOK & McDONOUGH, PC 
By 
'Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
700216vl 33 14064.0001 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this 27th day of June, 2005: 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
James "Tucker" Hansen, P.C. 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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Bruce R. Murdock, Bar No. 6948 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801)756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN ) 
WEST, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, " 
and as Trustee of the Lamar 
West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and 
as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar 
West Trust dated January 21, 1999, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
) Case No. 990404457 
) Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment against Defendant Claudia N. Case, as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 
1993 and as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, on Plaintiffs' first 
two causes of action alleged in their Complaint, Breach of Contract and Quiet Title. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Bruce R. Murdock and Defendant was represented by Don R. Peterson. 
After having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to 
the motion, the accompanying affidavits and exhibits, and all other relevant documents in the file, 
the Court makes the following ORDER: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Claudia N. 
Case, as Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the Georgia 
Lamar West Trust dated January 21, 1999, is granted. Defendant is Lamar West's successor 
pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereafter "Contract") entered into 
between Lamar West and Plaintiffs in early 1987. By failing to deliver a proper warranty deed to 
Plaintiffs, as required by paragraph 19 of the Contract, Defendant is in breach of the Contract. 
2. Title is quieted in Plaintiffs Arnold K. West and Mary Helen West in the 
Contract property, which is properly described as follows: 
Parcel 2; Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and 333.45 feet 
South from the American Fork City monument at the centerline intersection of 300 
West street and 300 North street; thence North 84°30' West 30.00 feet; thence 
South 16°59,15M West 176.14 feet to the North Right-of-Way line of Union Pacific 
Railroad Co.; thence South 63°23' East 89.29 feet along said Right-of-Way line; 
thence North 0°25' East 205.68 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 0.25 
acres. 
Parcel 3; Beginning 378.50 feet West along the monument line and South 333.45 
feet from the American Fork City monument at the centerline intersection of 300 
West street and 300 North street; thence South 0°25'00M West 205.58 feet to the 
north Right-of-Way line of the Union Pacific Railroad Co.; thence South 63°23,00" 
East 55.40 feet along said Right-of-Way line; thence North 0°25'00n East 225.61 
feet along a fence line; thence North 84°30'00" West 49.91 feet to the point of 
beginning. Containing .0246 acres. 
3. Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver a proper Warranty Deed to 
Plaintiffs for the property described in paragraph 2, which deed shall be prepared by Plaintiffs' 
2 
counsel. Defendant is ordered to execute and deliver this deed within ten days from the date of 
this Order. If Defendant does not execute and deliver the deed to Plaintiffs within ten days from 
the date of this Order, the clerk of the court is authorized to execute the deed on behalf of 
Defendant. 
4. Plaintiffs are awarded their reasonable attorney's fees and court costs piursuant 
to paragraph 21 of the Contract in the amount of $156.00 in court costs and $6,146.50 attorney's 
fees, as established by the Affidavit of Bruce R. Murdock, for a total award of $6,302.50, and 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendant in this amount. 
DATED this _/_ day of /JdO^i'^S^'T, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
JL/J /?S / / - V 7 X 
<r%dt mtf-^\ 
GaryD. Stott / ' / £-:V.\ . f
 ;< ;! 
Fourth Judicial District Cpurt Judge 
0* 
'
v
' CSVK\ * 
Approved as to form: 
Don R. Petersen 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order this /3 day of October, 2000 to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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rsunu 
...lllS-fiiir —PepUtV ^p^ 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No 5711 
BRUCE R. MURDOCK, Bar No. 6948 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN 
WEST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as 
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated 
May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the 
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated 
January 21,1999, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF 
ORDER AND FOR RECONSIDERA-
TION AJND DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No. 990404457 
DIVISION* \ 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the above-entitled court, 
Defendant's Motion for Amendment of Order and for Reconsideration and Defendant's Request 
for Oral Argument, and the Court having reviewed the relevant memoranda on file herein, and 
the Court having taken the matter under advisement, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Defendant's 
Motion for Amendment of Order and for Reconsideration, and Defendant's Request for Oral 
Argument are hereby denied, and Plaintiffs are hereby granted Judgment against the Defendant 
for their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in having to respond to the above Motion and as set 
forth more fully in the attached Affidavit of Attorney's fees filed herewith. 
DATED this (j day of February, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ''<%&'^^'/0' 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AMENDMENT OF ORDER AND FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT, 
postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this l^t day of February, 2001, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS& PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
120 East 300 North 
P.O.Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
SECRETARY/ 
Tab 3 
FILED 
^ou* ,n Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
1-
DON R. PETERSEN (2576) and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Our File No. 25,469 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN 
WEST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as 
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated 
May 6, 1993 and as Trustee of the 
Georgia Lamar West Trust dated January 
21, 1999, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CLARIFYING JUDGMENT 
Case No. 990404457 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division #7 
Defendant's Motion for Order Clarifying Judgments filed March 5, 2001, came 
regularly before the Court for consideration. No party opposed the motion and the time for 
response has expired. The Court therefore grants the motion. 
Based on the motion of defendant and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order entered November 1, 2000, and the 
Judgment entered February 16, 2001, do not impose any monetary judgment against Claudia N. 
Case individually. /^\ . 
of Jyte, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
&ZE2S& 
DATED this JPday Juk
STEVEI^Ll HANSEN 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIHCATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this _ c _ day of June, 2001. 
James "Tucker" Hansen, Esq. 
Duval, Hansen, Witt & Morley 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
fAJlL-
F:\LWS\CASE-CLA.ORD 
Tab 4 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
Fax:(801)328-0537 
Attorneys for Defendant Claudia N. Case 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD K. WEST and MARY HELEN 
WEST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CLAUDIA N. CASE, individually, and as 
Trustee of the Lamar West Trust dated May 6, 
1993, and as Trustee of the Georgia Lamar 
West Trust dated January 21, 1999, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Civil No. 990404457 
Division 7 
Judge James E. Taylor 
Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims for slander of title in the above entitled 
action, as pled at the Third Cause of Action in Plaintiffs Complaint herein, be and hereby are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
This Order, coupled with (1) this Court's Order of November 1, 2000; (2) this Court's 
Judgment of February 1, 2001, and (3) this Court's Order Clarifying Judgment of July 2, 2001, 
d S 6 7 ! i v ; 
all entered in this action, shall constitute final judgment on the merits of all issues in this action 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this J \ day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
James E. Taylor 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
James 'Tucker" H. Hansen 
d * f t " i I v i -2-
